According to the “carrot-and-stick base” the war coalition on Yemen trying to push Islah Islamic party to get out his factions from the east and south cities, and to prepare the situation in order to form new government and share the regional influence, faraway from Ali Mohsen or Hadi’s interventions, will coalition able to do that, and what are the party’s options to confront the new arrogance that threatens his future?
The recent and intense air strikes on Islah in Marib, Abyan and Al-Jawf provinces, in parallel with the Saudi withdrawal from Marib and the new arrangements in Aden city, indicate that the coalition decided to use the stick this time against Islah party, which strongly defends on the decision to remain in Abyan and refuses to withdraw from Shabwah and Hadhramaut.
Over the past months, the coalition tried to deliver many messages for Islah party, the first of which started with Saudi Arabia’s matching with UAE coup in Aden in August of last year and the subsequent air strikes targeting the party’s factions in Al-Alam.
Saudi Arabia tried with all its majesty to urge the party to exit from this strategic and resource-rich region, so it formulated with Emirates “Riyadh Agreement” which included provisions forcing the party’s factions to leave the areas in which the coalition was eager to share influence there. however, it did not work out, so Saudi Arabia re-wrote the agreement by offering the political part before the military part, But it did not work out, so Saudi Arabia re-wrote the agreement by offering the political part before the military part, so once again at a standstill.
Saudi Arabia has emptied out all its diplomatic papers, with the party, beginning with the British ambassador, who offered British-American support to Marib governor Sultan Al-Arada in exchange Islah factions withdrawing from Abyan. Hinting to the need to get out from the oil triangle that extend from Abyan to Hadhramout valley, even the terrorism paper that US threatened through it the party and activated its drones to pressure on them with attacks in Marib and Shabwah did not work.
Saudi Arabia is re-shaping its relationship with Islah party which has been its upper hand in Yemen over the past decades, and the aim is to cut it off as it extends to anti-Saudi parties, and all moves indicate that Saudi Arabia is on its way to uproot the elusive party by force. it is began with the dismissal of Fahd bin Turki, commander the commander of the coalition joint forces, and the radical changes that took place at the level of the middle commanders of its forces stationed in Yemen, not to mention supporting STC’s opponents on the west coast and the south by modernizing their forces and using drones into the operations theater.
Saudi Arabia and UAE will not stop harassing Islah party as part of its series to weaken Yemeni forces and even defeating it to Marib. In the event that they achieve consensus, it is only for some time and prepare to pounce them in their last strongholds, whether by warplanes that target any groupings of the party or by the factions that have been equipping for some time in the depths of Islah’s strongholds to oppress them.
Saudi Arabia will push, during the next stage, to crack down on Islah party politically by reducing its influence in the new government and militarily through targeting the leaders of its military wings, which are currently accused of plotting with Qatar and Turkey, whether through official dismissals or military targeting…
Regardless of what the coalition plotting against Islah whether in the west, east, or south. The indicators of the party’s pulse are still ongoing. It is currently arranging for a blow coming from Taiz towards Mocha, and Lahij in conjunction with its mobilization in Abyan province and its eye on Aden, even in Marib, it does not seem that the party which some news talking about his knocking the dialogue door with Sana’a from the gate of Qatar, concerned about the city fall, in which it is subjected to abuse by its opponents in UAE wing or by the coalition war jets, amid accusations that it is planning a plot to hand over the province in preparation for a broad alliance against Saudi Arabia and UAE.
Away from the accusations against Islah which seems a prelude to a blow by the coalition, or even his moves to confront the coalition militarily, Islah’s options seem limited, because of other side’s strength and the absence of patriotism among Islah, which joined the alliance since the beginning, without internal and transnational alliances, the “resistance” of Islah to the coalition’s path remains a matter of time, no more.